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Abstract
Datasets containing sensitive information are often sequentially analyzed by many algorithms.
This raises a fundamental question in differential privacy regarding how the overall privacy bound
degrades under composition. To address this question, we introduce a family of analytical and
sharp privacy bounds under composition using the Edgeworth expansion in the framework of the
recently proposed f -differential privacy. In contrast to the existing composition theorems using
the central limit theorem, our new privacy bounds under composition gain improved tightness by
leveraging the refined approximation accuracy of the Edgeworth expansion. Our approach is easy
to implement and computationally efficient for any number of compositions. The superiority of
these new bounds is confirmed by an asymptotic error analysis and an application to quantifying
the overall privacy guarantees of noisy stochastic gradient descent used in training private deep
neural networks.
1 Introduction
Machine learning, data mining, and statistical analysis are widely applied to various applications
impacting our daily lives. While we celebrate the benefits brought by these applications, to an
alarming degree, the algorithms are accessing datasets containing sensitive information such as
individual behaviors on the web and health records. By simply tweaking the datasets and leveraging
the output of algorithms, it is possible for an adversary to learn information about and even identify
certain individuals [FJR15, SSSS17]. In particular, privacy concerns become even more acute when
the same dataset is probed by a sequence of algorithms. With knowledge of the dataset from the
prior algorithms’ output, an adversary can adaptively analyze the dataset to cause additional privacy
loss at each round. This reality raises one of the most fundamental problems in the area of private
data analysis:
How can we accurately and efficiently quantify the cumulative
privacy loss under composition of private algorithms?
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To address this important problem, one has to start with a formal privacy definition. To date, the
most popular statistical privacy definition is (, δ)-differential privacy (DP) [DKM+06, DMNS06],
with numerous deployments in both industrial applications and academic research [EPK14, ACG+16,
PAE+16, DKY17, App17, Abo18]. Informally, this privacy definition requires an unnoticeable change
in a (randomized) algorithm’s output due to the replacement of any individual in the dataset. More
concretely, letting  ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, an algorithm M is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for any pair
of neighboring datasets S, S′ (in the sense that S and S′ differs in only one individual) and any
event E,
P(M(S) ∈ E) ≤ eε P(M(S′) ∈ E) + δ. (1.1)
Unfortunately, this privacy definition comes with a drawback when handling composition.
Explicitly, (, δ)-DP is not closed under composition in the sense that the overall privacy bound of a
sequence of (at least two) (, δ)-DP algorithms cannot be precisely described by a single pair of the
parameters , δ [KOV17]. Although the precise bound can be collectively represented by infinitely
many pairs of , δ, [MV16] shows that it is computationally hard to find such a pair of privacy
parameters.
The need for a better treatment of composition has triggered a surge of interest in proposing gen-
eralizations of (, δ)-DP, including divergence-based relaxations [DR16, BS16, Mir17, BDRS18] and,
more recently, a hypothesis testing-based extension termed f -differential privacy (f -DP) [DRS19].
This privacy definition leverages the hypothesis testing interpretation of differential privacy, and
characterizes the privacy guarantee using the trade-off between type I and type II errors given
by the associated hypothesis testing problem. As an advantage over the divergence-based privacy
definitions, among others, f -DP allows for a concise and sharp argument for privacy amplification
by subsampling. More significantly, f -DP is accompanied with a technique powered by the central
limit theorem (CLT) for analyzing privacy bounds under composition of a large number of private
algorithms. Loosely speaking, the overall privacy bound asymptotically converges to the trade-off
function defined by testing between two normal distributions. This class of trade-off functions gives
rise to Gaussian differential privacy (GDP), a subfamily of f -DP guarantees.
In deploying differential privacy, however, the number of private algorithms under composition
may be moderate or small (see such applications in private sparse linear regression [KST12] and
personalized online advertising [LO11]). In this regime, the CLT phenomenon does not kick in
and, as such, the composition bounds developed using CLT can be inaccurate [DRS19, BDLS19].
To address this practically important problem, in this paper we develop sharp and analytical
composition bounds in f -DP without assuming a larger number of algorithms, by leveraging the
Edgeworth expansion [Hal13]. The Edgeworth expansion is a technique for approximating probability
distributions in terms of their cumulants. Compared with the CLT approach, in our setting, this
technique enables a significant reduction of approximation errors for composition theorems.
In short, our Edgeworth expansion-powered privacy bounds have a number of appealing properties,
which will be shown in this paper through both theoretical analysis and numerical examples.
• The Edgeworth expansion is a more general approach that subsumes the CLT-based approxi-
mation. Moreover, our new privacy bounds tighten the composition bounds that are developed
in the prior art [DRS19, BDLS19].
• Our method is easy to implement and computationally efficient. In the case where all trade-off
functions are identical under composition, the computational cost is constant regardless of the
number of private algorithms. This case is not uncommon and can be found, for example, in
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the privacy analysis of noisy stochastic gradient descent (SGD) used in training deep neural
networks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the f -DP framework.
Section 3 introduces our methods based on the Edgeworth expansion. Section 4 provides a two-
parameter interpretation of the Edgeworth approximation-based privacy guarantees. Finally, we
present experimental results to demonstrate the superiority of our approach in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries on f-Differential Privacy
Let a randomized algorithm M take a dataset S as input. Leveraging the output of this algorithm,
differential privacy seeks to measure the difficulty of identifying the presence or absence of any
individual in S. The (ε, δ)-DP definition offers such a measure using the probabilities that M gives
the same outcome for two neighboring datasets S and S′. A more concrete description is as follows.
Let P and Q denote the probability distribution of M(S) and M(S′), respectively. To breach the
privacy, in essence, an adversary performs the following hypothesis testing problem:
H0 : output ∼ P vs H1 : output ∼ Q.
The privacy guarantee of M boils down to the extent to which the adversary can tell the two
distributions apart. In the case of (, δ)-DP, the privacy guarantee is expressed via 1.1. The
relationship between differential privacy and hypothesis testing is first studied in [WZ10, KOV17,
LHC+19, BBG+19]. More recently, [DRS19] proposes to use the trade-off between type I and type
II errors of the optimal likelihood ratio tests at level ranging from 0 to 1 as a measure of the privacy
guarantee. Note that the optimal tests are given by the Neyman–Pearson lemma, and can be
thought of as the most powerful adversary.
Trade-off function. Let φ be a rejection rule for testing against H0 against H1. The type I and
type II error of φ are EP (φ) and 1− EQ(φ), respectively. The trade-off function T : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
between the two probability distributions P and Q is defined as
T (P,Q)(α) = inf
φ
{1− EQ(φ) : EP (φ) ≤ α} .
That is, T [P,Q](α) equals the minimum type II error that one can achieve at significance level
α. A larger trade-off function corresponds to a more difficult hypothesis testing problem, thereby
implying more privacy of the associated private algorithm. When the two distributions are the
same, the perfect privacy is achieved and the corresponding trade-off function is T (P, P )(α) = 1−α.
In the sequel, we denote this function by Id(α). With the definition of trade-off functions in place,
[DRS19] introduces the following privacy definition (we say f ≥ g if f(α) ≥ g(α) for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1):
Definition 2.1. Let f be a trade-off function. An algorithm M is f -differentially private if
T (M(S),M(S′)) ≥ f for any pair of neighboring datasets S and S′.
While the definition above considers a general trade-off function, it is worthwhile noting that f
can always be assumed to be symmetric. Letting f−1(α) := inf{0 ≤ t ≤ 1 : f(t) ≤ α} (note that
f−1 = T (Q,P ) if f = T (P,Q)), a trade-off function f is said to be symmetric if f = f−1. Due to
the symmetry of the two neighboring datasets in the privacy definition, an f -DP algorithm must be
3
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Type I Error
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
T
yp
e
II
E
rr
or
f-DP
supporting lines
Figure 2.1: An example of a trade-off function and two supporting lines induced by the associated
(ε, δ(ε))-DP guarantees. These lines have slopes −e±ε, respectively, and intercepts 1− δ.
max{f, f−1}-DP. Compared to f , the new trade-off function max{f, f−1} is symmetric and gives a
greater or equal privacy guarantee. For the special case where the lower bound in Definition 2.1 is
a trade-off function between two Gaussian distributions, we say that the algorithm has Gaussian
differential privacy (GDP):
Definition 2.2. Let Gµ := T (N (0, 1),N (µ, 1)) ≡ Φ(Φ−1(1 − α) − µ) for some µ ≥ 0, where
Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution. An
algorithm M gives µ-GDP if T (M(S),M(S′)) ≥ Gµ for any pair of neighboring datasets S and S′.
Duality to (ε, δ)-DP. The f -DP framework has a dual relationship with (ε, δ)-DP in the sense
that f -DP is equivalent to an infinite collection of (ε, δ)-DP guarantees via the convex conjugate of f .
One can view f -DP as the primal representation of privacy, and accordingly, its dual representation
is the collection of (ε, δ)-DP guarantees. In this paper, the Edgeworth approximation addresses
f -DP from the primal perspective. However, it is also instructive to check the dual presentation. The
following propositions introduce how to convert the primal to the dual, and vice versa. Geometrically,
each associated (ε, δ)-DP guarantee defines two symmetric supporting linear functions to f (assuming
f is symmetric). See Figure 2.1.
Proposition 2.3 (Primal to Dual). For a symmetric trade-off function f , let f∗ : R → R be its
convex conjugate function f∗(y) = sup0≤x≤1 yx− f(x). A mechanism is f-DP if and only if it is
(ε, δ(ε))-DP for all ε ≥ 0 with δ(ε) = 1 + f∗(−eε).
Proposition 2.4 (Dual to Primal). Let I be an arbitrary index set such that each i ∈ I is associated
with εi ∈ [0,∞) and δi ∈ [0, 1]. A mechanism is (εi, δi)-DP for all i ∈ I if and only if it is f-DP
with f = supi∈I fεi,δi , where fε,δ(α) = max {0, 1− δ − eεα, e−ε(1− δ − α)} is the trade-off function
corresponding to (, δ)-DP.
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Next, we introduce how f -DP guarantees degrade under composition. With regard to composition,
SGD offers an important benchmark for testing a privacy definition. As a popular optimizer for
training deep neural networks, SGD outputs a series of models that are generated from the
composition of many gradient descent updates. Furthermore, each step of update is computed
from a subsampled mini-batch of data points. While composition degrades the privacy, in contrast,
subsampling amplifies the privacy as individuals uncollected in the mini-batch have perfect privacy.
Quantifying these two operations under the f -DP framework is crucial for analyzing the privacy
guarantee of deep learning models trained by noisy SGD.
Composition. Let f1 = T (P1, Q1) and f2 = T (P2, Q2), [DRS19] defines a binary operator ⊗ on
trade-off functions such that f1 ⊗ f2 = T (P1 × P2, Q1 × Q2), where P1 × P2 is the distribution
product. This operator is commutative and associative. The composition primitive refers to an
algorithm M that consists of n algorithms M1, . . . ,Mn, where Mi observes both the input dataset
and output from all previous algorithms1. In [DRS19], it is shown that if Mi is fi-DP for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
then the composed algorithm M is f1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ fn-DP. The authors further identify a central limit
theorem-type phenomenon of the overall privacy loss under composition. Loosely speaking, the
privacy guarantee asymptotically converges to GDP in the sense that f1⊗ · · · ⊗ fn → Gµ as n→∞
under certain conditions. The privacy parameter µ depends on the trade-off functions f1, . . . , fn.
Subsampling. Consider the operator Samplep that includes each individual in the dataset with
probability p independently. Let M ◦ Samplep denote the algorithm where M is applied to the
subsampled dataset. In the subsampling theorem for f -DP, [DRS19] proves that if M is f -DP,
then M ◦ Samplep(S) is f˜ -DP if f˜ ≤ fp and f˜ ≤ f−1p , where fp = pf + (1 − p)Id. As such, we
can take f˜ = min{fp, f−1p }, which is not convex in general however. This issue can be resolved by
using min{fp, f−1p }∗∗ in place of min{fp, f−1p }, where f∗∗ denotes the double conjugate of f . Indeed,
[DRS19] shows that the subsampled algorithm is min
{
fp, f
−1
p
}∗∗
-DP.
Noisy SGD. Let Mσ denote the noisy gradient descent update, where σ is the scale of the
Gaussian noise added to the gradient. The noisy SGD update can essentially be represented as
Mσ ◦ samplep. Exploiting the above results for composition and subsampling, [BDLS19] shows
that Mσ ◦ Samplep is min{h, h−1}-DP, where h = pG1/σ + (1− p)Id. Recognizing that noisy SGD
with n iterations is the n-fold composition of Mσ ◦ Samplep(S), the overall privacy lower bound
is min{g, g−1}-DP, where g = h⊗n = (pG1/σ + (1− p)Id)⊗n. To evaluate the composition bound,
[BDLS19] uses a central limit theorem-type result in the asymptotic regime where p
√
n converges
to a positive constant as n→∞: in this regime, one can show g → G
p
√
n(e1/σ
2−1) and consequently
min
{
g, g−1
}∗∗ → G
p
√
n(e1/σ
2−1) as well.
3 Edgeworth Approximation
In this section, we introduce the Edgeworth expansion-based approach to computing the privacy
bound under composition. The development of this approach builds on [DRS19], with two crucial
modifications.
1In this paper, n denotes the number of private algorithms under composition, as opposed to the number of
individuals in the dataset. This is to be consistent with the literature on central limit theorems.
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Consider the hypothesis testing problem H0 : x ∼ P1 × · · · × Pn vs H1 : x ∼ Q1 × · · · ×Qn. Let
P denote the distribution P1 × · · · × Pn, and pi(·) denote the probability density functions of Pi.
Correspondingly, we define Q and qi in the same way. Letting Li(·) = log qi(·)
pi(·) , the likelihood ratio
test statistic is given by Tn(x) = log
∏n
i=1 qi(xi)∏n
i=1 pi(xi)
=
n∑
i=1
Li(xi). The Neyman–Pearson lemma states
that the most powerful test at a given significance level α must be a thresholding function of Tn(x).
As a result, the optimal rejection rule would reject H0 if Tn(x) > η, where η is determined by α.
An equivalent rule is to apply thresholding to the standardized statistic: H0 is rejected if
Tn(x)− EP [Tn(x)]√
VarP [Tn(x)]
> h(α), (3.1)
where the threshold h is determined by α.
In the sequel, for notational simplicity we shall use Tn to denote Tn(x), though it is a
function of x. Let Fn(·) be the CDF of Tn − EP [Tn]√
VarP [Tn]
when x is drawn from P . That is,
Fn(h) = Pp
(
Tn−EP [Tn]√
VarP [Tn]
≤ h
)
. By the Lyapunov CLT, the standardized statistic Tn−EP [Tn]√
VarP [Tn]
converges
in distribution to the standard normal random variable. In other words, it holds that
Tn − EP [Tn]√
VarP [Tn]
d−→ N (0, 1), Fn(·)→ Φ(·)
as n→∞. Likewise, we write F˜n(h) = PQ
(
Tn−EQ[Tn]√
VarQ[Tn]
≤ h
)
with x ∼ Q and get
Tn − EQ[Tn]√
VarQ[Tn]
d−→ N (0, 1), F˜n(·)→ Φ(·).
With these notations in place, one can write the type I error of the rejection rule (3.1) as
α = PP
(
Tn − EP [Tn]√
VarP [Tn]
> h
)
= 1− Fn(h). (3.2)
The type II error of this test, which is f(α) by definition, is given by
f(α) = PQ
(
Tn − EP [Tn]√
VarP [Tn]
≤ h
)
= PQ
(
Tn − EQ[Tn]√
VarP [Tn]
≤ h− EQ[Tn]− EP [Tn]√
VarP [Tn]
)
.
In [DRS19], the authors assume that f is symmetric and therefore derive the identity VarQ(Tn) =
VarP (Tn). As a consequence, f(α) can be written as F˜n(h − µn), where µn = (EQ[Tn] −
EP [Tn])/
√
VarQ[Tn]. Taken together, the equations above give rise to f(α) = F˜n(F−1n (1− α)− µn).
Leveraging this expression of f , [DRS19] proves a CLT-type asymptotic convergence result under
certain conditions:
f(α)→ Gµ(α) = Φ(Φ−1(1− α)− µ) (3.3)
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as n→∞, where µ is the limit of µn.
Now, we discard the symmetry assumption and just rewrite
f(α) = PQ
(
Tn − EP [Tn]√
VarP [Tn]
≤ h
)
= PQ
(
Tn − EQ[Tn]√
VarP [Tn]
≤ h− EQ[Tn]− EP [Tn]√
VarP [Tn]
)
= PQ
(
Tn − EQ[Tn]√
VarQ[Tn]
≤
[
h− EQ[Tn]− EP [Tn]√
VarP [Tn]
]√
VarP [Tn]
VarQ[Tn]
)
= F˜n
(
(h− µn)
√
VarP [Tn]
VarQ[Tn]
)
.
(3.4)
Plugging Equation 3.2 into 3.4, we obtain
f(α) = F˜n
((
F−1n (1− α)− µn
)√VarP [Tn]
VarQ[Tn]
)
. (3.5)
In the special case f is symmetric, the factor
√
VarP [Tn]
VarQ[Tn] is equal to one and we recover the result in
[DRS19].
To obtain the composition bound, the exact computing of Equation 3.5 is not trivial. In Section 5.1
we present a numerical method to compute it directly; however, this method is computationally
daunting and could not scale to a large number of compositions. The CLT estimator (Equation 3.3)
can be computed quickly, however it can be loose for a small or moderate number of compositions.
More importantly, in practice, we observe that the CLT estimator does not handle the composition of
asymmetric trade-off functions well. To address these issues, we propose a two-sided approximation
method, where the Edgeworth expansion is applied to both Fn and F˜n in Equation 3.5. Our method
leads to more accurate description of f(α), as justified in Section 5.
3.1 Technical Details
In Equation 3.5, we need to evaluate F˜n and F
−1
n . Our methods for addressing each of them are
described below.
Approximate F˜n. Assume x ∼ Q. Denote
XQ =
Tn − EQ[Tn]√
VarQ(Tn)
=
∑n
i=1(Li − µi)√∑n
i=1 σ
2
i
, (3.6)
where µi and σ
2
i are the mean and variance of Li under distribution Qi. Recall F˜n is the CDF of XQ,
and we can apply the Edgeworth expansion to approximate F˜n directly, following the techniques
introduced in [Hal13]. It provides a family of series that approximate F˜n in terms of the cumulants
of XQ, which can be derived from the cumulants of Lis under distribution Qis. See Definition 3.1
for the notion of cumulant and Appendix B for how to compute them.
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Definition 3.1. For a random variable X, let K(t) be the natural logarithm of the moment-
generating function of X: K(t) = logE
(
etX
)
. The cumulants of X, denoted by κ0, . . . , κr, . . .
for integer r > 0, are the coefficients in the Taylor expansion of K(t) about the origin: K(t) =
logE
(
etX
)
=
∑∞
r=0 κrt
r/r!.
The key idea of the Edgeworth approximation is to write the characteristic function of the
distribution of XQ as the following form:
χn(t) =
(
1 +
∞∑
j=1
Pj(it)
nj/2
)
exp(−t2/2),
where Pj is a polynomial with degree 3j, and then truncate the series up to a fixed number of
terms. The corresponding CDF approximation is obtained by the inverse Fourier transform of the
truncated series. The Edgeworth approximation of degree j amounts to truncating the above series
up to terms of order n−
j
2 .
Let κ˜r(Li) be the r-th cumulant of Li under Qi, and κ˜r =
∑n
i=1 κ˜r(Li). Let σn =
√∑n
i=1 σ
2
i .
Denoted by F˜EW(h)
2, the degree-2 Edgeworth approximation of F˜n(h) is given by
F˜EW(h) = Φ(h)−
T1︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ−3n ·
1
6
κ˜3(h
2 − 1)φ(h)
−
T2︷ ︸︸ ︷(
σ−4n
24
κ˜4(h
3 − 3h) + σ
−6
n
72
κ˜23(h
5 − 10h3 + 15h)
)
φ(h) .
(3.7)
The term T1 is of order n
− 1
2 and T2 is of order n
−1. See Appendix A for detailed derivations.
Our framework covers the CLT approximation introduced in [DRS19]. The CLT approximation is
equivalent to the degree-0 Edgeworth approximation, whose approximation error of order n−
1
2 .
Approximate F−1n . In Equation 3.5 we need to compute the F−1n (1 − α). This is the 1 − α
quantile of the distribution of Tn(x)−EP [Tn(x)]√
VarP [Tn(x)]
, where x is P distributed. We consider two approaches
to deal with it.
Method (i): First compute the degree-2 Edgeworth approximation FEW(·) of Fn(·):
FEW(h) =Φ(h)− σ−3n ·
1
6
κ3(h
2 − 1)φ(h)
− σ−4n ·
1
24
κ4(h
3 − 3h)φ(h)
− σ−6n ·
1
72
κ23(h
5 − 10h3 + 15h)φ(h),
(3.8)
where κr =
∑n
i=1 κr(Li) and κr(Li) is the r-th cumulant of Li under Pi. Next, numerically solve
equation FEW(h)− 1− α = 0.
2We note that F˜EW(h) is not guaranteed to be a valid CDF in general, however it is a numerical approximation to
Fn(h) with improved error bounds compared to the CLT approximation.
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of f(α) obtained when approximating F−1n (·) using Method (i) and (ii).
The approximation of F˜n(·) is fixed as in Equation 3.7.
Method (ii): Apply the closely related Cornish-Fisher Expansion [CF38, FC60], an asymptotic
expansion used to approximate the quantiles of a probability distribution based on its cumulants,
to approximate F−1n (·) directly. Let z = Φ−1(1− α) be the 1− α quantile of the standard normal
distribution. The degree-2 Cornish-Fisher approximation of the 1− α quantile of Tn−EP [Tn]√
VarP (Tn)
is given
by
F−1n (1− α) ≈ z + σ−3n
1
6
κ3(z
2 − 1)
+ σ−4n
1
24
κ4(z
3 − 3z)− σ−6n
1
36
κ23(2z
3 − 5z).
(3.9)
Both approaches have pros and cons. The Cornish-Fisher approximation has closed form solution,
yet Figure 3.1 shows that it is unstable at the boundary when the number of compositions is small.
For our experiments in Section 5, we use the numerical inverse approach throughout all the runs.
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3.2 Error Analysis
Here we provide an error bound for approximating the overall privacy level f using Edgeworth
expansion. For simplicity, we assume that f is symmetric and the log-likelihood ratios Li’s are iid
distributed with the common distribution having sufficiently light tails for the convergence of the
Edgeworth expansion, under both P and Q.
The Edgeworth expansion of degree 2 satisfies both Fn(h) − FEW(h) = O(n− 32 ) and F˜n(h) −
F˜EW(h) = O(n
− 3
2 ). Conversely, the inverse satisfies F−1n (α) − F−1EW (α) = O(n−
3
2 ) and F˜−1n (α) −
F˜−1EW (α) = O(n
− 3
2 ) for α that is bounded away from 0 and 1. Making use of these approximation
bounds, we get
fEW(α) = F˜EW(F
−1
EW (1− α)− µ)
= F˜EW(F
−1
n (1− α) +O(n−
3
2 )− µ)
= F˜n(F
−1
n (1− α) +O(n−
3
2 )− µ) +O(n− 32 )
= f(α) +O(n−
3
2 ).
As a caveat, we remark that the analysis above does not extend the error bound O(n−
3
2 ) to a type I
error that is close to 0 or 1. The result states that the approximation error of using the Edgeworth
expansion quickly tends to 0 at the rate of O(n−
3
2 ). This error rate can be improved at the expense
of a higher order expansion of the Edgeworth series. For comparison, our analysis can be carried
over to show that the approximation error of using CLT is O(n−
1
2 ).
3.3 Computational Cost
The computational cost of the Edgeworth approximation can be broken down as follows. We first
need to compute the cumulants of Li under Pi and Qi up to a certain order, for i = 1, . . . , n. Next,
we need to compute F−1EW (1− α). The Cornish-Fisher approximation (Equation 3.9) costs constant
time. If we choose to compute the inverse numerically, we need to evaluate Equation 3.8 then solve
a one-dimensional root-finding problem. The former has a constant cost, and the latter can be
extremely efficiently computed by various types of iterative methods, for which we can consider the
cost as constant too. Finally, it costs constant time to evaluate F˜EW(·) using Equation 3.7. Therefore,
the only cost that might scale with the number of compositions n is the computation of cumulants.
However, in many applications including computing the privacy bound for noisy SGD, all the Lis
are iid distributed. Under such condition, we only need to compute the cumulants once. The total
cost is thus a constant independent of n. This is verified by the runtime comparison in Section 5.
4 A Two-Parameter Privacy Interpreter
Let M1 and M2 be two private algorithms that are associated with trade-off functions f1 and f2,
respectively. The algorithm M2 will be more private than M1 if f2 upper bounds f1. For the family
of Gaussian differentially private algorithms, this property can be reflected by the parameter µ ≥ 0
directly, where a smaller value of µ manifests a more private algorithm.
Here we provide a two-parameter description (µ∗, γ) for the Edgeworth approximation, through
which the privacy guarantee between two different approximations can be directly compared.
Given an approximation fEW, let α
∗ be its fixed point such that fEW(α∗) = α∗. Let µ∗ be the
parameter of GDP for which Gµ∗ admits the same fixed point as fEW: Gµ∗(α
∗) = α∗. Such µ∗ can
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Figure 4.1: Left: An illustration of the (µ∗, γ) parameterization. Right: f (2)EW is more private than
f
(1)
EW .
be computed in closed form:
µ∗ = Φ−1(1− α∗)− Φ−1(α∗).
Let γ =
∫ 1
0 fEW(α)dα be the area under the curve of fEW.
Two symmetric Edgeworth approximations3 f
(1)
EW and f
(2)
EW can be compared in the sense that
f
(2)
EW is more private than f
(1)
EW if their associated parameters (µ
∗(1), γ(1)) and (µ∗(2), γ(2)) satisfy the
following condition:
µ∗(2) < µ∗(1) and γ(2) > γ(1).
The left panel of Figure 4.1 provides the geometric interpretation of the above parameterization.
The Edgeworth approximation fEW, the CLT approximation Gµ∗ , and the line y = x intersect at the
point (α∗, α∗).
The right panel compares two Edgeworth approximations f
(1)
EW and f
(2)
EW . It is easy to see that in
this case f
(2)
EW upper bounds f
(1)
EW and thus it is more private than f
(1)
EW . There are two important
properties. First, its intersection with the line y = x is further away from the original point than
f
(1)
EW . Consider the geometric interpretation shown in the left panel. This implies that µ
∗(2) < µ∗(1).
Second, the approximation f
(2)
EW also has a larger area under the curve than f
(1)
EW , which is essentially
γ(2) > γ(1).
This parameterization defines a partial order over the set
{
(µ, γ) : µ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 12
}
4. It is
also applicable to general trade-off functions.
5 Experiments
In this section, we present numerical experiments to compare the Edgeworth approximation and
the CLT approximation. Before we proceed, we introduce a numerical method to directly compute
3If f is asymmetric, we can always symmetrize it by taking min
{
f, f−1
}∗∗
.
4The perfect privacy is attained when the trade-off function is Id(α) = 1− α, whose area under the curve is 1
2
.
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the true composition bound in Section 5.1. This method is not scalable and hence merely serves
as a reference for our comparison. We use the Edgeworth approximation of degree 2 for all
the experiments. In the sequel, we refer to those methods as Edgeworth, CLT, and Numerical,
respectively. All the methods are implemented in Python5 and all the experiments are carried out
on a MacBook with 2.5GHz processor and 16GB memory.
5.1 A Numerical Method
Consider the problem of computing f⊗n numerically. We know that we can find P,Q such that f =
T (P,Q) and f⊗n = T (Pn, Qn). However, computing T (Pn, Qn) directly involves high-dimensional
testing, which can be challenging. We show this difficulty can be avoided by going from the primal
representation to the dual representation. Let (ε, δk(ε)) be the dual representation associated with
f⊗k. The method contains three steps to obtain δn(ε) for f⊗n.
1. Convert f to δ1(ε). This step can be done implicitly via P and Q, see Lemma 5.1.
2. Iteratively compute δk+1(ε) from δk(ε) using Lemma 5.2.
3. Convert δn(ε) to f
⊗n using Proposition 2.4.
Next, we explain how to compute δk+1(ε) from δk(ε). First, we need a lemma that relates δ1(ε)
with P,Q.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose f = T (P,Q) and P,Q have densities p, q with respect to a dominating
measure µ. Then the dual representation δ1(ε) = 1 + f
∗(−eε) satisfies δ1(ε) =
∫
(q − eεp)+dµ.
Suppose we are given f1 = T (P1, Q1), f2 = T (P2, Q2). Let δ1, δ2 and δ⊗ be the dual representa-
tions of f1, f2 and f1 ⊗ f2 respectively. The following lemma shows how to evaluate δ⊗ from δ1 and
δ2. To simplify notations, we assume Pi, Qi are distributions on the real line and have corresponding
densities pi, qi for i = 1, 2 with respect to Lebesgue measure. Generalization to abstract measurable
space is straightforward.
Lemma 5.2. Let L2(y) = log
q2(y)
p2(y)
. Then δ⊗(ε) =
∫
R
δ1
(
ε− L2(y)
)
q2(y)dy.
In particular, it yields a recursive formula to compute f⊗n when f = T (P,Q). Again we assume
P,Q has densities p, q on the real line. Let L(x) = log q(x)p(x) . We have
δ0(ε) = max{1− eε, 0}
δk+1(ε) =
∫
δk
(
ε− L(x))dx
f⊗n(α) = sup
ε∈R
1− δn(ε)− eεα.
We remark here that if f is asymmetric, then the dual involves negative ε, which is why the
conversion to f⊗n involves the whole real line. The proof of the above lemmas is deferred to
Appendix D.
5The code is available at https://github.com/enosair/gdp-edgeworth.
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In practice, it is more efficient to store δn in the memory than to perform the computation on
the fly, so we need to discretize the domain and store the function value on this grid. Consider an
abstract grid {εj}Nj=1 ⊆ R, the recursion goes as follows:
δ0(εj) = max{1− eεj , 0}, j = 1, . . . , N
δk+1(εj) =
∫
δk
(bεj − L(x)c)dx, j = 1, . . . , N
f⊗n(α) = sup
16j6N
1− δn(εj)− eεjα.
where bεj−L(x)c = max{εl : εl 6 εj−L(x)}. This rounding step can be replaced by an interpolation
as well.
The major challenge in making this numerical method practical for computing composition prod-
uct of trade-off functions is that it is slow in computation as it involves nN numerical integrations.
5.2 A Moderate Number of Compositions
Section 3 shows that the approximation error of Edgeworth is O(n−
3
2 ), and for CLT the error is
O(n−
1
2 ). We thus expect for small or moderate values of n, Edgeworth will produce non-negligible
outperformance to CLT. To verify this, we investigate their performance on a toy problem for testing
order-n compositions of Laplace distributions6: P = Lap(0, 1)⊗n vs Q = Lap(θ, 1)⊗n.
We let the number of compositions n vary from 1 to 10. Since the privacy guarantee decays
as n increases and the resulting curves would be very close to the axes, we set θ = 3/
√
n for the
sake of better visibility. Figure 5.1 plots the estimated trade-off functions for four representative
cases n = 1, 3, 5, 10. For each of the methods, we also compute the associated (ε, δ)-DP (see
Proposition 2.3) and plot δ as a function of ε in Figure 5.2. From both the primal and dual views,
Edgeworth coincides better with Numerical in all the cases. When the number of compositions
is 10, even though the difference between Edgeworth and CLT is small in the primal visualization
(Figure 5.1), the (ε, δ) presentation still clearly distinguishes them. In addition, due to the heavy
tail of the Laplace distribution, we shall have T ({Lap(0, 1)}⊗n , {Lap(θ, 1)}⊗n) ≥ fε,0 for ε ≥ nθ
(see Definition 2.4 for the exact form of fε,δ). Therefore, the ground truth has the property that
δ(ε) = 0 for ε ≥ nθ. Figure 5.2 shows that Edgeworth also outperforms CLT for predicting this
changing point.
n = 2 n = 4 n = 6 n = 8 n = 10
CLT 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005
Edgeworth 0.2347 0.2341 0.2391 0.2222 0.2234
Numerical 3.6834 7.3361 12.055 16.729 21.3575
Table 1: Runtime for estimating the trade-off function for testing Lap(0, 1)⊗n vs Lap(3/
√
n, 1)⊗n.
Table 1 reports the runtime of the above experiment. CLT takes constant computing time at the
scale of 1e-4 second. Due to the homogeneity of the component distributions under composition,
the runtime of Edgeworth is also invariant of the composition number, which is at the scale of 0.1
second. Numerical is computationally heavy. Its runtime is much larger and grows linearly as the
number of compositions.
6 The density function of Lap(θ, b) is 1
2b
exp(− |x− θ| /b).
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Figure 5.1: The estimated trade-off functions for testing Lap(0, 1)⊗n vs Lap(3/
√
n, 1)⊗n.
5.3 Privacy Guarantees for Noisy SGD
We inspect the performance of Edgeworth and CLT on estimating the privacy guarantee for n-
step noisy SGD. As introduced in Section 2, the privacy bound is of form min
{
g, g−1
}∗∗
where
g = (pG1/σ + (1− p)Id)⊗n, and the CLT estimation is Gµ with µ = p
√
n(e1/σ2 − 1). For Edgeworth,
note that pG1/σ + (1 − p)Id is the trade-off function of testing the standard normal distribution
N (0, 1) versus the mixture model pN ( 1σ , 1) + (1 − p)N (0, 1) (see Appendix C for the proof). It
follows that g = T (N (0, 1)⊗n, {pN (1/σ, 1) + (1− p)N (0, 1)}⊗n). As a result, Edgeworth can be
applied by exploiting the cumulants of N (0, 1) and pN (1/σ, 1) + (1− p)N (0, 1).
n = 1 n = 50 n = 100 n = 200 n = 500
CLT 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Edgeworth 0.2504 0.2198 0.2087 0.2257 0.3048
Numerical 35.7 2138.9 4980.7 7784.8 14212.1
Table 2: Runtime for computing 0.5/n
1
4 (G1 + Id)
⊗n.
Here we present the result when p = 0.5/n
1
4 . Since the convergence of CLT requires the
14
−5 0 5 10
²
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
δ(
²)
n = 1
numerical
Edgeworth
CLT
x = nθ
−5 0 5 10
²
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
δ(
²)
n = 3
−5 0 5 10
²
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
δ(
²)
n = 5
−5 0 5 10
²
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
δ(
²)
n = 10
Figure 5.2: The associated (ε, δ(ε))-DP of the estimated trade-off functions for testing Lap(0, 1)⊗n
vs Lap(3/
√
n, 1)⊗n.
assumption p
√
n → ν > 0 [BDLS19], this is the regime that the performance of CLT does not
have theoretical guarantees, and we shall see in the following experiment that CLT significantly
deviates Numerical. Nevertheless, even in this case, Edgeworth enjoys a nearly perfect match with
Numerical. We also investigated the case p = 0.5/n−
1
2 , where the convergence of CLT is guaranteed.
In this regime, we shall see that Edgeworth still outperforms CLT. The results are deferred to
Appendix E.
We let n vary from 1 to 500. The noise scale σ is set to 1. Figure 5.3 presents the estimated
g for two representative cases n = 5 and n = 500. Figure 5.4 shows the final estimation after
symmetrization, for a few selected values of n. Obviously, Edgeworth is very close to Numerical for
all the cases. Unlike the previous experiment, where CLT performs reasonably well when n reaches
10, here the difference between CLT and the other two remains large even when n = 500.
Table 2 presents the runtime comparison. Clearly, Numerical is not scalable. It takes more
than two hours to compute 500 compositions, whereas CLT and Edgeworth can be computed within
one second. The runtime of Numerical has grown three orders of magnitude from n = 1 to n = 500,
yet the runtime of CLT and Edgeworth remains constant for all the runs.
15
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Type I Error
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
T
yp
e
II
E
rr
or
n = 5
numerical
Edgeworth
CLT
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Type I Error
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
T
yp
e
II
E
rr
or
n = 500
numerical
Edgeworth
CLT
Figure 5.3: The estimation of 0.5/n
1
4 (G1 + Id)
⊗n.
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Figure 5.4: The estimation of the privacy bound for n-step noisy SGD. The sampling rate is
p = 0.5/n
1
4 and the noise scale is σ = 1.
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A The Edgeworth Approximation
We can apply Edgeworth expansion to approximate F˜n directly, following the techniques introduced
in [Hal13]. Let us assume x ∼ Q. Denote
XQ =
Tn − EQ[Tn]√
VarQ(Tn)
=
∑n
i=1(Li − µi)√∑n
i=1 σ
2
i
, (A.1)
where µi and σ
2
i are the mean and variance of Li under the distribution Qi. The characteristic
function of XQ is
χn(t) = exp
( ∞∑
i=1
κ˜r(XQ)
(it)r
r!
)
,
where κ˜r(XQ) is the r-th cumulant of XQ. Details of how to compute the cumulants are summarized
in Appendix B. Let σn =
√∑n
i=1 σ
2
i . Particularly we have
κ˜1(XQ) = EQ(XQ) = 0,
κ˜2(XQ) = VarQ(XQ) = 1,
...
κ˜r(XQ) = κ˜r
(
σ−1n
n∑
i=1
(Li − µi)
)
= σ−rn
n∑
i=1
κ˜r(Li), ∀r > 2.
(A.2)
We will denote the sum of n cumulants by κ˜r =
∑n
i=1 κ˜r(Li). Under the series expansion of the
exponential function, we will have
χn(t) = exp
(
− t
2
2
)
exp
( ∞∑
r=3
σ−rn
r!
κ˜r(it)
r
)
≈ exp
(
− t
2
2
)
exp
∑
r=3,4
σ−rn
r!
κ˜r(it)
r

≈ exp
(
− t
2
2
)(
1 + σ−3n ·
r1(it)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
6
κ˜3(it)
3
+ σ−4n ·
r2(it)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
24
κ˜4(it)
4 +σ−6n ·
r3(it)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
72
κ˜23(it)
6
)
.
(A.3)
Since χn(t) =
∫
eithdF˜n(h) and e
−t2/2 =
∫
eithdΦ(h), we can obtain the corresponding “inverse”
expansion:
F˜n(h) ≈ Φ(h) + σ−3n ·R1(h) + σ−4n ·R2(h) + σ−6n ·R3(h), (A.4)
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and Rj(h) is a function whose Fourier-Stieljes transform equals rj(it)e
−t2/2:∫ ∞
−∞
eithdRj(h) = rj(it)e
−t2/2.
Let D denote the differential operator d/dh. We have
e−t
2/2 = (−it)−j
∫ ∞
−∞
eithd
{
DjΦ(h)
}
and hence ∫ ∞
−∞
eithd
{
(−D)jΦ(h)} = (it)je−t2/2.
Let us interpret rj(−D) as a polynomial in D, we then obtain∫ ∞
−∞
eithd {rj(−D)Φ(h)} = rj(it)e−t2/2.
Consequently,
Rj(h) = rj(−D)φ(h). (A.5)
It is well known that for j ≥ 1,
(−D)jΦ(h) = −Hej−1(h)φ(h) (A.6)
and Hejs are the Hermite polynomials:
He0(h) = 1,
He1(h) = h,
He2(h) = h
2 − 1,
He3(h) = h
3 − 3h,
He4(h) = h
4 − 6h2 + 3,
He5(h) = h
5 − 10h3 + 15h,
He6(h) = h
6 − 15h4 + 45h2 − 15,
He7(h) = h
7 − 21h5 + 105h3,
. . .
(A.7)
Combine equations A.4, A.5, A.6 and A.7 we can deduce the final result:
F˜n(h) ≈ Φ(h) + σ−3n · −
1
6
κ˜3(h
2 − 1)φ(h)
+ σ−4n · −
1
24
κ˜4(h
3 − 3h)φ(h)
+ σ−6n · −
1
72
κ˜23(h
5 − 10h3 + 15h)φ(h).
(A.8)
In A.3, the truncation happens in both the second and third line. In the second line, we truncated
terms where r ≥ 5. In the following line, we apply the series expansion to the exponential function,
and we stopped after taking t1 := σ
−3
n · 16 κ˜3(it)3, t2 := σ−4n · 124 κ˜4(it)4 and the square of t1.
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The error stems from truncating r ≥ 5 terms in the second line will be dominated by
1
120
σ−5n κ˜5(it)5 in the series expansion. The error stems from truncating the expansion of r = 3, 4
terms in the following line will be dominated by the square of t2: σ
−8
n · 1576 κ˜24(it)8.
Since all Li’s are identically distributed, the cumulants of L1, . . . Ln take the same value for any
fixed order. Therefore, σ1 = · · · = σn = σ and κ˜r = κ˜r(L1) = · · · = κ˜r(Ln). As a consequence, we
have σn =
√
nσ and κ˜r = nκ˜r. This leads to
σ−3n · κ˜3(it)3 ∼ n−1/2(it)3,
σ−4n · κ˜4(it)4 ∼ n−1(it)4,
σ−6n · κ˜23(it)6 ∼ n−1(it)6,
σ−8n · κ˜24(it)8 ∼ n−2(it)8,
σ−5n · κ˜5(it)5 ∼ n−3/2(it)5.
(A.9)
Hence the error for approximating χn(t) is upper bounded by O
(
n−2(it)8 + n−3/2(it)5
)
. Next, we
connect the characteristic function to CDF F˜n(h). From equations A.5 and A.6, we know the error
term will be transformed into O
(
n−2He7(h) + n−3/2He4(h)
)
as approximating F˜n(h), which is
O
(
n−2h7 + n−3/2h3
)
.
B Computing Cumulants From Moments
The cumulants of a random variable X are defined using the cumulant-generating function K(t). It
is the natural logarithm of the moment-generating function:
K(t) = logE
(
etX
)
,
and the cumulants are the coefficients in the Taylor expansion of K(t) about the origin:
K(t) = logE
(
etX
)
=
∞∑
r=0
κrt
r/r!.
For any integer r ≥ 0, the r-th order non-central moment of X is µr = E(Xr). Recall the Taylor
expansion of the moment-generating function M(t) about the origin
M(t) = E
(
etX
)
=
∞∑
r=0
µrt
r/r! = exp (K(t)) .
The cumulants can be recovered in terms of the moments and vice versa. In general,
κr =
r∑
k=1
(−1)k−1(k − 1)!Br,k(µ1, . . . , µr−k+1)
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where Bn,k are Bell polynomials. The relationship between the first few cumulants and moments is
as the following:
κ0 = 0,
κ1 = µ1,
κ2 = µ2 − µ21,
κ3 = µ3 − 3µ2µ1 + 2µ31,
κ4 = µ4 − 4µ3µ1 − 3µ22 + 12µ2µ21 − 6µ41.
C N (0, 1) vs pN (µ, 1) + (1− p)N (0, 1))
Let P be the standard normal distributionN (0, 1) and Q be a mixture model pN (µ, 1)+(1−p)N (0, 1)
with µ > 0. We now show that
Lemma C.1.
T (P,Q) = pGµ + (1− p)Id.
Proof. The likelihood ratio between Q and P is
pe−
1
2
(x−µ)2+ 1
2
x2 + 1− p = peµx− 12µ2 + 1− p.
Since µ > 0, likelihood ratio tests are thresholding, i.e., {x : x > h}. The type I and type II errors
are
α = P{x : x > h} = 1− Φ(h),
β = Q{x : x 6 h}
= pEx∼N (µ,1)[1{x:x6h}] + (1− p)Ex∼N (0,1)[1{x:x6h}]
= pΦ(h− µ) + (1− p)Φ(h).
Inverting the first formula, we have h = Φ−1(1− α). So
β = pΦ(h− µ) + (1− p)Φ(h) = pΦ(Φ−1(1− α)− µ) + (1− p)(1− α)
Making use of the known expression Gµ(α) = Φ
(
Φ−1(1− α)− µ) and Id(α) = 1− α, we have
T (P,Q)(α) = β = pGµ(α) + (1− p)Id(α).
D Details of the Numerical Method
D.1 Proof of Lemma 5.1
Proof. By definition of convex conjugacy, δ > δ1(ε) if and only if f(x) > 1− δ− eεx for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Since f = T (P,Q) characterizes optimal testing rules, f(x) > 1− δ − eεx for any x ∈ [0, 1] if and
only if for any event E, Q[E] 6 eεP [E] + δ. That is,
δ1(ε) = min{δ : Q[E] 6 eεP [E] + δ, ∀E}
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= max
E
Q[E]− eεP [E]
= max
E
∫
E
[
q(x)− eεp(x)]dµ(x).
Obviously, the maximum is attained at the event that the integrand being non-negative. That is,
E = {x : q(x)− eεp(x) > 0}. Therefore,
δ1(ε) =
∫ (
q − eεp)
+
dµ.
D.2 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Proof. By definition of ⊗ and Lemma 5.1, we have
δ⊗(ε) = 1 + (f1 ⊗ f2)∗(−eε)
= 1 +
(
T (P1 × P2, Q1 ×Q2)
)∗
(−eε) (Def of ⊗)
=
∫∫ (
q1(x)q2(y)− eεp1(x)p2(y)
)
+
dxdy (Lemma 5.1)
=
∫∫
q2(y) ·
(
q1(x)− eεp1(x) · p2(y)q2(y)
)
+
dxdy (q2(y) > 0)
=
∫∫
q2(y) ·
(
q1(x)− eε−L2(y)p1(x)
)
+
dxdy (Def of L2)
=
∫
q2(y) ·
[ ∫ (
q1(x)− eε−L2(y)p1(x)
)
+
dx
]
dy (Fubini)
=
∫
q2(y) · δ1
(
ε− L2(y)
)
dy. (Lemma 5.1 on δ1)
E Privacy Guarantees for Noisy SGD with Sampling Rate p = 0.5√
n
In Section 5.3 we present the result when the sampling rate p = 0.5/n
1
4 . Since the convergence of
CLT requires the assumption p
√
n→ ν > 0 [BDLS19], that is a regime where the performance of
CLT does not have theoretical guarantees. Here we present the results when p = 0.5/n
1
2 , where the
convergence of CLT is guaranteed. However, we still observe that Edgeworth outperforms CLT. See
Figure E.1 and E.2 for the comparison.
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Figure E.1: The estimation of 0.5/n
1
2 (G1 + Id)
⊗n.
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Figure E.2: The estimation of the privacy bound for n-step noisy SGD. The sampling rate is
p = 0.5/n
1
2 and the noise scale is σ = 1.
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